

Civil War, U.S.

The Civil War, in U.S. history, was a conflict that pitted the Northern states of the American Union against the Southern states. The war raged for 4 years (1861-65) and was marked by some of the fiercest military campaigns of modern history. Large armies were involved in large movements, and entire populations were engaged in supporting the war efforts of both sides. The war had international impact, not only because of the growing international stature of the United States, but also because war threatened world access to the South's cotton. Britain and France had particular interest in the war's outcome, but other nations were also affected by it.

Historians still argue over causes and effects of the war. A few have looked at the Civil War in a hemispheric and even world context. This perspective is enlightening, for the American Civil War fits into a general pattern of Western Hemispheric conflict in the 19th century that brought new political alignments to South America and new unity to Canada. The war's main effects, however, were felt in the United States, which entered the war as a nation on the threshold of industrial revolution and finished it as a world power. The South entered as a loose collection of agrarian states devoted to almost feudal protocols and lost everything. It is possible to view the Civil War as the war of American unification, because it forged a modern nation and wrought vast social and economic change.

ORIGINS

Although historians commonly trace the coming of the Civil War through the 1850s, some roots of separation were present as early as the colonial period. Troubles between Tidewater (coastal region) and Piedmont (the interior) settlers often reflected differences in philosophies of government: the Tidewater was an older, more settled region, and its citizens wanted little government interference; Piedmont people, on the other hand, looked to government for protection along the frontier, for ready money and light taxation. Those differences shifted with time. Under the Articles of Confederation, adopted while the American Revolution was still being fought, the "pluribus" theory of government prevailed. Sovereignty rested with the states, and they gave limited powers to a weak central administration. With the adoption (1787) and ratification of the federal Constitution, however, the "unum" theory came to the fore, and strong national government began in America.

State Rights

Old affections for loose administration and small government died hard. At the end of the 18th century, STATE RIGHTS ideas were supported in the KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. Thomas JEFFERSON, who secretly wrote Kentucky's protest against aggressive federalism, suggested that the states ought to have a veto over offensive legislation. James MADISON, in Virginia's protest, shared the state supremacy idea. Not all the states agreed, and a national debate emerged with a decision only partially achieved by Jefferson's election to the presidency in 1800.

Jefferson was expected to restrain the federal government's interference in state and local matters. Responsibility changed some of his views, and he became a strong executive, as shown by the Louisiana Purchase (1803) and the Embargo Act (1807). Generally, however, he continued to feel "that government is best which governs least."

Economic Issues

Constitutional arguments centered on the uses of power, especially in economic matters. Troubles between the older and younger parts of emerging states usually had an economic origin; these troubles could be settled only by government intervention. Perhaps the best example is the WHISKEY REBELLION of 1794. In a test of federal authority over individuals, President George Washington called out troops to collect whiskey taxes in western Pennsylvania. Federal authority prevailed.

Taxes plagued federal-state-citizen relationships throughout the first half of the 19th century. The first protective tariff in 1789 brought the earliest of many clashes between Northern and Southern economic views. Southern producers wanted a tariff on hemp; Northern users wanted none. Gradually tariff arguments pitted Northern manufacturing interests and small farmers against Southern planters and slaveholders. Friction increased with each new tariff bill until, finally, the so-called Tariff of Abominations of 1828 caused a confrontation between federal and state authority (see TARIFF ACTS). This bill forced Vice-President John C. CALHOUN to change his personal and political views. Earlier a strong nationalist, he now shifted to sectionalism and so broke with Andrew JACKSON, who had selected Calhoun to run again for the vice-presidency in the 1828 election.

Nullification Controversy

Despite his position in the federal government, Calhoun wrote the "South Carolina Exposition and Protest," which the South Carolina legislature adopted (1828) as its manifesto against bad federal laws. In it Calhoun ingeniously claimed the right of states to nullify federal laws that they deemed unconstitutional. The NULLIFICATION controversy came to a head in 1832 when South Carolina declared the tariff laws null and void and President Jackson responded with the threat of force. By this time Calhoun had resigned the vice-presidency and become a South Carolina senator. His theories of government shaped South Carolina's views, and at length he devised a theory of secession that prescribed the steps for leaving the Union. Although a compromise solution to this particular crisis was found, Calhoun's ideas were to be invoked again in 1861.

Slavery and Territorial Expansion

Politics and economics conspired against the Union in the next 30 years. Politics became inextricably mixed with the SLAVERY issue in the years after the MISSOURI COMPROMISE (1820-21), by which Maine entered the Union as a free state and Missouri as a slave state but slavery was forbidden in the rest of the Louisiana Purchase territory north of 36 deg 30' north latitude. Southern leaders feared their power in the House of Representatives would dwindle as new free states were created. They resisted in the Senate by calling for a Southern slave state to balance every Northern free one and by upholding the ideas of state sovereignty and the sanctity of private property—even slaves.

These issues were involved in the debates over annexation (1845) of TEXAS and the MEXICAN WAR, by which the United States acquired a large block of territory not affected by the Missouri Compromise. Having unsuccessfully opposed both the annexation and the war, antislavery forces sought by the WILMOT PROVISION (1846) to bar extension of slavery into the new territories. When this failed, the COMPROMISE OF 1850 was worked out, whereby California entered the Union as a free state, the question of slavery in New Mexico and Utah was left open, and a new FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW was passed to appease Southern interests.

The adjustment of the border with Mexico by the GADSDEN PURCHASE (1853) introduced another element into the sectional dispute, because it made possible a southern route for the proposed TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD. In addition to its economic value to the South, this route would have carried Southern settlers to the West. The building of such a railroad was blocked until 1882. The slavery issue thus impinged on many developments of the era, although other major influences were also at work—for example, the westward movement (see FRONTIER) and the burgeoning spirit of MANIFEST DESTINY.

Like the lingering legal case of DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD, the Union's troubles persisted. As slave Scott's petition for freedom, made because of temporary residence in a free state, meandered toward the Supreme Court (where it was finally denied in 1857), the Compromise of 1850 began to crumble. The existence of personal liberty laws in many Northern states nullified the effect of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, the South's keystone of compromise. Moreover, new controversy arose over the status of Kansas and Nebraska, through which a powerful Northern segment wished to run the transcontinental railroad. These territories were covered by the Missouri Compromise, but in order to win Southern support for the route, Sen. Stephen A. DOUGLAS of Illinois proposed that the principle of POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY be applied, allowing the settlers in each territory to decide for or against slavery. The resulting KANSAS-NEBRASKA ACT (1854), which in effect repealed the Missouri Compromise, enraged the antislavery forces, who coalesced to form the new REPUBLICAN PARTY, and led to a rush of pro- and antislavery settlers into Kansas. Armed conflict soon followed, turning that territory into "Bleeding Kansas."

The Antislavery Movement and Southern Response

By the mid-1850s the spirit of accommodation had all but vanished. Northern interest in emancipation, pushed by ABOLITIONISTS, eroded relations between families north and south. William Lloyd GARRISON's Liberator was the extremist voice of abolitionism, calling for immediate emancipation of the slaves by extralegal means if necessary. Although not representative of majority abolitionist opinion, this voice roused the deep-seated fear of slave insurrection among Southerners, who pointed to the actions of Denmark VESSEY, Nat TURNER, and finally John BROWN as examples of what could become a horror as great as Haiti's bloodbath.

As the Northern antislavery movement changed its tactics from direct political action—for example, attacks on slavery in the state legislatures—to general moral condemnation of all Southerners, Southern attitudes began to set. In the early 1830s the South had claimed the largest number of antislavery societies; by the mid-1850s all such societies were north of the Mason-Dixon line. From an uneasy mood over slavery, Southerners evolved a

"positive good" philosophy and argued that slaveowners provided shelter, food, care, and regulation for a race unable to compete in the modern world without proper training. After Harriet Beecher STOWE's Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852) indicted all slaveowners to the world, most creative Southern minds turned toward the defense of slavery. Increasingly threatened by a wealthy and developing North, Southerners evolved almost a "garrison philosophy" as they clung to the past for protection.

There was much to cherish in the society of the Old South—an agrarian humanism, a leisurely pace of life for the privileged, gracious manners, and the stability that came from a sense of kin and place. Yet this fading Eden existed on the backs of the slaves who worked the cotton plantations. Slavery was not only a cause for moral indictment but an anachronism. Britain had abolished it decades earlier; even Russia's serfs were nearing emancipation; and South America offered the example of assimilation as a solution to the problem of social control that so troubled the Southerners. The South, however, wore its burden as a badge of tradition that it stood ready to defend. In that frame of mind, it faced the election of 1860, an election made fateful by the emergence of the Republican party and its new standard-bearer, Abraham LINCOLN.

The 1860 Election

Lincoln, the Illinois small-town lawyer, had run a stiff but unsuccessful senatorial race against Stephen A. Douglas in 1858 and gained much renown in their publicized debates. He came to national candidacy apparently as a champion of freedom; his new party united the remnants of the old FREE-SOIL PARTY and LIBERTY PARTY.

Douglas wanted the Democratic nomination in 1860, but he had alienated much Southern opinion by his denunciation of Kansas's proslavery LECOMPTON CONSTITUTION. He finally gained the support of a fractured Democratic party. The Democratic national convention in Charleston, S.C., ruptured. A Southern Democratic party emerged with John C. BRECKINRIDGE as its presidential candidate, and another group, the CONSTITUTIONAL UNION PARTY, also contested the election. So splintered were the Democrats that Lincoln captured the election with 180 electoral votes against 123 for his combined opponents, although in popular vote he garnered only 1,866,452 against his major opponents' 2,815,617.

WAR COMES

News of the election returns spread rapidly. The loudest alarm rang in South Carolina, but secession fires were stoked across the South.

Secession

Calhoun's doctrine of a Union based on a compact between equals seemed logical to Southerners. Most believed that secession was legal—New Englanders were thought to have debated secession at the HARTFORD CONVENTION (1814-15)—but the timing had to be right. Some Southerners had talked of secession during the crisis of 1850, but sentiment had not yet congealed nor was the South in any sense prepared for independence. Moderates counseled caution; realists counseled discretion—there were not enough factories, shipyards, railroads, or guns in the South to wage war.

By 1860 many conditions were different. Political attitudes about slavery had now hardened, and the Southern economy seemed strong. The South's international importance as the leading supplier of cotton was also now clear. Moreover, a major financial panic in 1857 had disrupted the Northern economy but touched the South only lightly. If secession were necessary—and the election of Lincoln, a "black Republican" apparently made it so—late 1860 might be the best moment.

Secession brought anguish to many but exultation to the "fire-eaters" of the South. Many Southerners hoped that the threat of secession would force acceptance of Southern demands; others worked to assure cooperation among many Southern states before a single one committed itself—and perhaps suffered South Carolina's 1832 isolation. The South also had its Unionists, who worked to prevent disruption. Old-time Whigs were often Unionists as were some individuals such as Sam HOUSTON of Texas. Excitement and fear finally overwhelmed the moderates and temporizers, however, and on Dec. 20, 1860, a South Carolina convention unanimously adopted an ordinance of secession. Mississippi seceded on Jan. 9, 1861, followed by Florida on January 10, Alabama on January 11, Georgia on January 19, Louisiana on January 26, and Texas on February 1. On Feb. 4, 1861, delegates from these states met in Montgomery, Ala., where they drafted a constitution for the CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA. Jefferson DAVIS of Mississippi was selected provisional president and inaugurated on February 18.

Confederate Leadership

President Jefferson Davis seemed to have all the necessary qualifications for success. A West Point graduate with a record of heroic service in the Mexican War, he had served long and ably in the U.S. Senate and as secretary of war in Franklin Pierce's cabinet. An admitted disciple of Calhoun, Davis had nimbly and eloquently defended the South's position in national debate and ranked among the most influential politicians of the country in 1861. Not an extremist on the slave issue, he was nonetheless a defender of the Southern "way of life," and his reputation lent stature to the new nation. He did not want the presidency, but he accepted duty's summons. Cool, aloof, almost haughty, he lacked, some thought, the natural gift of winning people, but he compensated for this with realism and dogged devotion to the Confederate cause. Davis's vice-president, Alexander H. STEPHENS, also seemed a good choice for his office, but a warping, corrosive ambition turned Stephens quickly from loyalty to resentment, and he spent most of the war years in semiopposition as a member of a Georgia junta of dissatisfaction.

Davis formed his cabinet—generally able and industrious men—and sought peaceful relations with Lincoln's government, but he also prepared for war. Early military legislation created regular and "provisional" land and naval forces, assumed Confederate control of all military operations affecting the South, and set quotas for state militia contributions to a 100,000-man army. In the weeks after he took office, Davis focused increasingly on Confederate control of public property, especially military installations such as Fort Pickens, in Pensacola harbor, and FORT SUMTER, in Charleston harbor. The latter was especially important; without control of Charleston harbor, a key international port, the Confederacy could scarcely claim sovereignty. Sumter became the supreme symbol of independence.

Everything Davis did, however, had to be balanced against statistical realities. Seven Southern states (11 when Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas seceded in the spring) would stand against 23 Northern states, would pit 9 million people—3 million of them slaves and hence not military assets—against 22 million. Industrial and manufacturing advantages were all with the North, along with twice as many miles of railroad and a better managed and equipped agriculture. The South boasted no more than \$27 million in specie, mostly in New Orleans banks. The North had diplomatic relations with foreign powers and hence had unlimited credit. It was not clear where, if anywhere, a rebel group of cotton states could borrow money.

Lincoln's Position

Davis had no monopoly on problems. In the months following his election Lincoln juggled office-seekers, party promises, and the doings of the lame-duck incumbent, James BUCHANAN. Sympathetic to Southern views, Buchanan suffered a paralyzing view of the Constitution and secession—he thought secession unconstitutional, but he believed that the constitution gave him no power to prevent it. By doing nothing, he permitted secession to run its course. He gave no help to the Peace Convention that assembled in Washington during February 1861 and no leadership to a Congress struggling with various schemes to prevent disruption, including the CRITTENDEN COMPROMISE, which proposed a constitutional amendment to divide the whole continent into slave and free zones along 36 deg 30' north latitude.

Lincoln also played a part in the failure of compromise. Trying to avoid committing himself to anything before gaining power, he nonetheless let others "attribute" ideas to him, including opposition to compromises that might result in extending slavery. Republican leaders in Congress adopted his apparent intransigence and steadily opposed compromise. In fact, Lincoln was willing to protect slavery where it existed, even by constitutional amendment, and thought the Fugitive Slave Act should be enforced. Neither he nor his spokesmen made his views clear, however, and the South came to see him as being against compromise of any kind.

In some ways Lincoln's problems were worse than those of Davis. The president was not the strongest man in his party—Thurlow WEED and William H. SEWARD were far more powerful—and Lincoln was an outsider to Washington ways. He had to learn to be president against entrenched forces. Like Davis, he had to judge the temper of his country. Did the North want compromise? Were Northerners willing to force war over the slave issue? He did not know; nor did he know, for some time, exactly what he felt himself.

Fort Sumter

After inauguration, Lincoln still labored under the handicap of stronger subordinates. Seward, as secretary of state, tried to run the government and involved himself in prolonged duplicity with Southern representatives over the Fort Sumter issue. Dangling possibilities of negotiation before Davis's emissaries, Seward virtually compromised the honor of the government. Lincoln stayed aloof, considered the Sumter question in proper political terms, and

decided to push at that point. The Confederates, almost fooled, realized at last that a Federal expedition would come to the fort's aid and that forbearance by the South would appear to the world as weakness. On Apr. 12, 1861, Confederate cannons opened fire, and Fort Sumter became the first battle of the American Civil War. Historians still argue over whether Lincoln maneuvered the South into firing the first shot.

Both Davis and Lincoln were concerned with unity; both wondered how solid their causes were. Inaction might erode sentiments for action on either side. Lincoln called out 75,000 volunteers on April 15 to suppress "combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." By calling troops to put down insurrection, Lincoln set the nature of the war; he officially denied the existence of the Confederacy and conceded only that the South contained "combinations" in rebellion. No declaration of war was necessary.

Initial Strategy

Lincoln had an almost geopolitical grasp of the Union's dilemma in the summer of 1861. The loss of Virginia was a serious blow, but Lincoln felt that the border states, especially Kentucky, were the keys to success. Should Kentucky go, communication with the West would be impaired and Confederates would threaten the heart of the North. He played a careful game to save the border and at length retained both Kentucky and Missouri, although the latter became a theater of war. The slave states of Delaware and Maryland also remained in the Union, and the western section of Virginia seceded from that state and entered the Union as West Virginia in 1863.

Not all Northerners either understood or approved of Lincoln's early course. His first inaugural address seemed to dangle an olive branch to the slave states, and some of his early actions looked indecisive. As sentiment ran for harsher action, Lincoln moved apace. Shortly after calling for volunteers, he proclaimed a blockade of Southern ports—the U.S. Navy boasted 42 commissioned ships in March—and pushed war taxes. Volunteers abounded, and a large army gathered near Washington.

Lincoln's military experience was limited, and he turned to career soldiers for advice on the next step. Venerable Winfield SCOTT, the ranking general in the U.S. Army, attempted to persuade Col. Robert E. LEE to assume command of federal forces, but Lee decided in favor of his native Virginia. Scott struggled to produce an overall strategy for the North, but then yielded to the "On to Richmond" outcry that summed up Northern sentiments. General Irvin MCDOWELL took command of the main federal army and fitted it for a Virginia offensive. Gathering men, supplies, munitions, and animals proved far more difficult than previous experience indicated, and an increasingly impatient North wondered when Lincoln's war would start.

Davis, on the other hand, pushed Confederate military preparations against some apathy. Although martial excitement spread across the South, few people thought of a serious war. Davis collected almost as many volunteers as did Lincoln and sent them to Virginia. He wanted to convince Virginians of the South's intent to defend the northern border of the Confederacy, and he also wanted to protect the Tredegar Iron Works and other munitions factories in Richmond—the nascent industrial heart of the South. Many officers resigned from the U.S. Army and joined the South; Davis looked to Gen. P. G. T. BEAUREGARD of Louisiana, who had commanded the action against Fort Sumter, to organize Confederate legions arriving near Richmond. Logistics and administration were as vexing to Southerners as to their enemies, and effective ranks took shape slowly. Initial Southern strategy was simply to fend off the enemy, to win by not losing. Energetic offensives might have been the better course, but Davis's government wanted to show nonaggressive intent.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

Historians have called the U.S. Civil War "the first modern war," with good reasons: railroads were first used in large-scale movement of troops and supplies; technological advances in ordnance and weaponry were marked; trench warfare was used; steam and ironclad warships became commonplace; whole populations were directly involved in supporting the war efforts of both sides; and new ways of raising, sustaining, and commanding massive armies were devised. Foreign observers were intrigued by American fighting methods and reported on revised cavalry tactics, on new dimensions in firepower, and on democratic reactions to regimentation. Even today a striking visual record of the conflict remains, for it was the first war to be systematically photographed—by Mathew B. BRADY and others.

First Bull Run

On July 21, 1861, roughly equal forces met near Manassas, Va., in the first major land battle of the war. McDowell's army (soon to be known as the Army of the Potomac) attacked Beauregard's lines along Bull Run

Creek. Successful early in the day, the Federals were at last held on the Confederate left by Gen. Thomas J. Jackson's brigade, rushed to the field by rail from the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson's men held off repeated attacks, and as Gen. Barnard E. Bee (1824-61) of South Carolina sought to rally his own men, he cried: "There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let us determine to die here, and we will conquer." Stonewall JACKSON became an internationally known hero in the wake of that rebel victory, but it proved to be costly. Southerners became overconfident, and Northerners buckled down for a long, hard war. (See BULL RUN, BATTLES OF.)

Following Bull Run, or Manassas, as it was called in the South (Northerners named battles after nearby bodies of water, Southerners after nearby places), both sides reorganized. Lincoln called Gen. George B. MCCLELLAN, fresh from small successes in western Virginia, to command the main Union force. Davis combined Beauregard's force with Gen. Joseph E. JOHNSTON's troops, and Johnston took the senior command of the Confederate forces in Virginia.

Other Activity in 1861

Major military activity centered in Virginia throughout the rest of 1861. McClellan built an enormous army to hurl against Richmond. Davis, advised by Robert E. Lee of Virginia's army, concentrated increased forces to defend that city, which became the Confederacy's new capital in May 1861. The sheer mass of troops numbed commanders. So much was needed to support so many that traditional organization simply could not sustain demand. With no time for innovative theorizing, offices and officers proliferated on both sides.

Distances too unnerved old army hands. While the heaviest preparations for battle continued in Virginia, conflict flickered along the border. In Missouri, where the secessionists had taken up arms against the Unionist majority, the Confederate militia defeated the Unionists at Wilson's Creek on Aug. 10, 1861. Union control of Missouri was not assured until Confederate forces were defeated at Pea Ridge, Ark., in March 1862.

Grant in the West, Spring 1862

The Union general Ulysses S. GRANT opened the 1862 campaign west of the Appalachian Mountains by capturing FORT HENRY AND FORT DONELSON on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers in February. Grant then began to advance southward toward Corinth, Miss., while part of the Union army under John POPE undertook to expel the Confederates from the upper Mississippi. Supported by a naval flotilla under Andrew FOOTE, Pope besieged and captured Island No. 10 in the Mississippi (March 16-April 7). In the meantime, however, the Confederate general Albert Sidney JOHNSTON concentrated his forces near Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., and on April 6 he launched a surprise attack against Grant's army at Shiloh Church (see SHILOH, BATTLE OF). One of the worst battles of any American war, Shiloh raged for two days.

Although the Confederates were initially successful, Johnston was mortally wounded on the first day, and command passed to Beauregard. Confusion and exhaustion sapped Confederate strength, and on April 7, Grant, reinforced by Gen. Don Carlos BUELL's army, counterattacked with great success. Beauregard withdrew, and the Union Army followed slowly, taking Corinth in May. The fall (April 26) of New Orleans to a U.S. fleet under David G. FARRAGUT was a third major blow to Confederates in the West. However, the war then stabilized in this theater.

Peninsular Campaign

In the east, McClellan had at last begun to move his vast army in March 1862. He planned a giant amphibious operation aimed at capturing Yorktown and moving on Richmond from the south. The water route to Richmond up the James River was closed by the presence of the Confederate ironclad Virginia (formerly the U.S.S. Merrimack, which survived a 4-hour engagement with the U.S.S. Monitor on March 9; see MONITOR AND MERRIMACK). However, McClellan intended to advance up the peninsula between the York and James rivers. By early April his forces had been transported by sea to the end of the peninsula and were massed to take Yorktown.

For the Confederates, grand tactics demanded some kind of diversion to fend the Yankees from Richmond. Lee, serving as military advisor to Davis, encouraged Stonewall Jackson to conduct such a campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, where his activities would threaten Washington. In a brilliant series of actions from March to June 1862, Jackson, with never more than 16,000 men, confused and stalled some 50,000 Union troops in the valley. As a result, McClellan, who had hoped for aid from a force under McDowell at Fredericksburg, did not receive any reinforcements for his campaign.

Having occupied Yorktown on May 4, McClellan began his cautious advance up the peninsula with more than 100,000 men. After a rear-guard action at Williamsburg (May 5), the Confederates, under Joseph E. Johnston, withdrew slowly until McClellan reached Seven Pines, about 14 km (9 mi) from Richmond. There on May 31-June 1, Johnston checked McClellan's advance in a pitched battle. Johnston, however, was severely wounded, and command of what would soon be known as the Army of Northern Virginia passed to Lee.

Applying Napoleonic tactics of flanking and fighting, Lee called Jackson to Richmond and planned a great wheeling turn of 95,000 men to flank McClellan's right and pin part of his army against the Chickahominy River. The plans were formulated on the basis of information from Jeb STUART, who had made a complete circuit of the Union positions. Inexperienced staff officers, unexpected delays, and stiff Union resistance prevented the total envelopment Lee had hoped for, but the Seven Days' Battles (June 26-July 1) forced McClellan to retreat from the peninsula, removing the threat against Richmond, and gave the Confederacy new hope. (See PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.)

Second Bull Run

Almost in despair of finding a winning general or combination, Lincoln appointed Henry W. HALLECK commanding general on July 11. Halleck put another Union army into Virginia under John Pope. As Pope advanced from Washington, Lee detached Jackson with more than half the Army of Northern Virginia to meet him. At Cedar Mountain on August 9, Jackson drove Pope back toward Manassas Junction. Having moved up to join Jackson, Lee sent him ahead again to flank Pope and outmarch him to Manassas. There Jackson destroyed the Union supply depot and took position near the old Bull Run battlefield. While Pope moved to attack Jackson on August 29, Lee sent forward James LONGSTREET's wing of the army, which hit Pope's left flank on August 30. Pope was smashed back across the Potomac. With McClellan's force already withdrawn from Virginia, that Confederate state was now virtually free from invaders. Davis and Lee pondered how to exploit success.

The South's Double Offensive of 1862

Lee was an apt student of Napoleonic teachings, including the French general's call for constant audacity in small powers fighting large ones. In September 1862 the Confederacy seemed to have a unique chance for a double offensive. In the west Gen. Braxton BRAGG, with the army that Albert Sidney Johnston and Beauregard had commanded (now known as the Army of Tennessee), was about to move north from Chattanooga, Tenn., into Kentucky. If Lee and Bragg moved in concert, the South might exploit its inner lines and concentrate more troops at crucial points than the enemy. Invasions of Maryland and Kentucky could be defended to the outside world: both were considered Confederate states, and the South would simply be seeking natural boundaries.

Moreover, such a combined offensive conformed to Davis's evolving strategy of the "offensive-defensive," which would permit the South to hoard its thin resources on the defensive and use them for attacks when special opportunities offered. Bragg moved north in late August, and Lee crossed the Potomac in early September.

Everywhere Union forces were on the defensive. The Army of the Potomac, once more under McClellan, reorganized near Washington. Buell's army retreated in confusion ahead of Bragg and was soon in what appeared to be a losing race for Louisville, Ky. If Louisville fell, all of Indiana and Ohio would be open to rebels, the Baltimore and Ohio rail link would break, and the Confederate flag might wave over the Great Lakes. If McClellan failed to halt Lee, Washington might fall. McClellan and Buell could lose the war.

Perryville and Antietam

As it happened, the rebel gamble failed. Bragg maneuvered Buell deftly out of Tennessee, but he avoided battle until too late and was defeated at Perryville, Ky., on Oct. 8, 1862. He retired toward Chattanooga.

Lee's invasion of Maryland went well at first. At Frederick he divided his army of 55,000, sending Jackson to take Harpers Ferry and open up a possible line of retreat to the Shenandoah Valley. However, a copy of Lee's order detailing troop dispositions fell into McClellan's hands, giving the latter an unusual chance of success.

Concentrating about 70,000 troops quickly in front of Lee at Sharpsburg, Md., along Antietam Creek, McClellan almost wrecked Lee's army, which Jackson had rejoined on September 17. The last-minute arrival of an absent division under A. P. HILL saved Lee (see ANTIETAM, BATTLE OF), but he was forced to retreat across the Potomac into Virginia on September 18-19. Incompetence and bad luck had ruined Davis's plan, but he did not lose heart.

Command Dilemmas

Lincoln nearly lost patience through the fateful summer of 1862. His grasp of strategy, untutored but sound, allowed him to see the chance offered Buell and McClellan. When both failed to seize that chance after victory, he replaced Buell with William S. ROSECRANS in late October, and put Ambrose E. BURNSIDE in McClellan's place in November. Rosecrans finally forced Bragg's withdrawal from central Tennessee with a costly victory at Stones River (Murfreesboro; December 31-January 3). Burnside, however, who attempted a new drive on Richmond, failed to cross the Rappahannock River with necessary speed at Fredericksburg and found Lee's army concentrated against him. Undaunted, Burnside launched a series of assaults against the entrenched Confederate lines on December 13. The Confederates held their position without difficulty, while Burnside sacrificed more than 12,000 men. A month later he was relieved of command. (See FREDERICKSBURG, BATTLE OF.)

Thus Lincoln still looked for someone willing to take the initiative and use effectively the massive strengths of the North. Strategy dictated combined use of army and naval forces to keep the Confederate units constantly occupied, to crush the South in a closing vise. As long as the Union armies fought individually, Southern armies, moving on inner lines, could concentrate against them.

Davis perceived the same problem. He developed a novel command structure that was ahead of its time—the theater command. He had followed traditional usage early when he adopted geographical departments as the main command components of the armies. Historically, geographical commands permitted commanders and forces within certain geographical limits to make combined use of military, civil, financial, and other resources; the Civil War's size, however, outstripped this older notion. In a large-scale theater of operations, several armies, as well as all other resources of government, would be available to the overall commander. Wise leadership could negate weaknesses in communications and logistics. A special commander, a general of experience and renown, was needed to make the novel idea successful. In November 1862, Davis picked Joseph E. Johnston as commander of the Department of the West, stretching from the Gulf of Mexico as far north as possible and from the Chattahoochee River to the Mississippi.

Davis and Johnston irritated each other, but Johnston had the requisite qualities for the job. Had he risen to the occasion, he might have made the summer of 1863 decisive to Confederate success. Instead, misunderstanding the vast powers bestowed on him, he lapsed into the role of inspector of armies in his domain and did not adequately coordinate reaction to General Grant's brilliant Vicksburg campaign in May, June, and July 1863.

Vicksburg Campaign

After Shiloh, Grant had been relegated to a subordinate position under Henry Halleck. When Halleck went to Washington in July 1862, Grant assumed command of the Army of Tennessee. In October, while Rosecrans (before he succeeded Buell) held Corinth against Confederate assault, Grant began to plan a thrust toward the last fragment of the Mississippi River held by the Confederacy. Although the mouth of the river was now in Union hands, the rebels still held a sufficient stretch to allow communication with the far West. The key point on this stretch was Vicksburg, Miss.

Grant's first two attempts to take Vicksburg failed (December 1862, January-March 1863). In the summer of 1863, however, he determined to stick to his plan until he succeeded. Daring tactics and unusual logistics learned from Winfield Scott in the Mexican War enabled Grant to cross the river south of Vicksburg on April 30 and march swiftly northeast toward Jackson, Miss., thus cutting Gen. John C. Pemberton's Vicksburg army off from the interior. Turning west, he penned Pemberton into Vicksburg and initiated a siege of the city on May 22. Johnston reacted timidly, failing to move Confederate forces south to trap Grant against the river. Vicksburg fell on July 4, 1863, and the Union captured 30,000 prisoners and much booty. (See VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.)

Chancellorsville

Grant's operations had been loosely connected with the spring offensive of the Army of the Potomac. Gen. Joseph HOOKER, Burnside's successor, had planned to flank Lee, who was still entrenched near Fredericksburg, and get between him and Richmond. However, Lee came out to meet Hooker in Virginia's Wilderness, detaching Jackson for a flanking attack. On May 1-4, Hooker was decisively beaten at Chancellorsville, but Jackson was mortally wounded, and gloom tinged the Southern success. (See CHANCELLORSVILLE, BATTLE OF.)

Gettysburg

On the heels of this victory, Lee seized the initiative by reorganizing his army and invading Pennsylvania. Pemberton needed a diversion to loosen the bonds at Vicksburg; Virginia was picked clean of food; and Lee thought he could reprovision his army as well as aid the West by moving north. He might have detached men to send west, but he persuaded Davis to try for a quicker decision.

At Gettysburg, Pa., on July 1, 1863, Lee's men met the Army of the Potomac, now commanded by George G. MEADE. Three days of fierce fighting resulted. On the first day the Confederates drove the Union forces back, until the latter reached a strong defensive position on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. On the second day, Confederate attacks on the Union flanks failed to dislodge Meade. Finally, on July 3, Lee ordered Gen. George Edward PICKETT to lead a charge against the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. About 15,000 dared the hill; some 6,000 were killed or wounded in the repulse. Lee lost a total of 28,000 in casualties, as well as many weapons. His train of wounded was miles long as his army retreated back to Virginia. (See GETTYSBURG, BATTLE OF.)

Chickamauga and Chattanooga

Vicksburg and Gettysburg were staggering blows to the Confederacy. The remainder of 1863 held little good news for the South, except for the flickering hope offered by a victory near Chattanooga in September.

In early September, Rosecrans maneuvered Bragg out of Chattanooga and pursued him into northwestern Georgia. Bragg, however, was reinforced by Longstreet's corps from Lee. Catching Rosecrans in an exposed position along Chickamauga Creek on September 19-20, Bragg smashed the Union forces back into Chattanooga's defenses. Bragg lost the impetus of success, however. Clapping an incomplete siege around Chattanooga, he frittered away his men in peripheral ventures. Longstreet, for example, was sent to lay siege to Burnside at Knoxville.

In mid-October, Grant, newly appointed as commander of all the Union forces in the West, replaced Rosecrans with George H. THOMAS and sent a relief force into Chattanooga. A month later, reinforced Union troops dislodged Bragg's forces from Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge (November 24-25). Longstreet abandoned the siege of Knoxville in early December, and the Confederate Army of Tennessee took refuge for the winter near Dalton, Ga. (See CHATTANOOGA, BATTLES OF; CHICKAMAUGA, BATTLE OF.)

Grant Takes Command

Lincoln had noted that Meade failed to press victory after Gettysburg, while Grant at Vicksburg had stuck to his campaign until victorious. Grant seemed to be the commander that Lincoln was looking for, and in March 1864 he became general in chief of all the Union armies. His task was to concentrate the North's massive resources in men and material and keep throwing them at the enemy.

When he gave Grant supreme command of the North's armies, Lincoln made a quantum advance in democratic command. Keeping the constitutional responsibility himself, he turned active charge of operations over to a man he trusted. This scheme, combined with Davis's theater structure, set the pattern for management of future U.S. wars.

Grant wasted no time. He placed the western armies under his old lieutenant, William T. SHERMAN, who had played a key role at both Vicksburg and Chattanooga. Meade was left in charge of the Army of the Potomac, but Grant established his own headquarters nearby. His plan was simple: keep pressure on the South's two major armies, prevent them from reinforcing each other, and fight throughout the summer. The offensive would start in May 1864.

Confederate Strategy, 1864

Reduced in strength and resources, Lee and Joseph Johnston, the latter again in command of the Army of Tennessee, hoped to beat Grant to the attack, but sufficient wagons and supplies were not available for an offensive. Late in 1863 Lee had a chance to trap Meade at Mine Run in the Virginia Wilderness, but he discovered that he lacked skilled commanders for the first time. Casualties had whittled away the experience in his top echelons; the younger men could only gain experience in the coming summer. Johnston was also unable to amass the men or transport to take the initiative that was so strongly urged by Davis.

In the campaigns that followed, both Confederate armies fended the enemy bravely. Their chief hope was to run up the cost of Union success beyond Northern patience as the presidential election of 1864 approached. Lincoln was under attack from Radical Republicans, who thought he had temporized too long on the question of emancipation of the slaves and disliked his moderate plan for postwar RECONSTRUCTION. On the other extreme, he had offended conservatives by suspending habeas corpus and by introducing (1863) conscription and his EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION. Antiwar feeling had been apparent in the DRAFT RIOTS of 1863, and even the northern victories of that year had not offset the high casualties. The South could at least hope that continuing high casualties would convince Northerners to elect George B. McClellan, who was the Northern Democrat's standard-bearer on a peace platform.

Virginia Campaigns of 1864-65

Casualties were running high. Launching a new drive on Richmond, Grant and Meade suffered heavy losses in the WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN of May-June 1864. At Cold Harbor on June 3, Grant made a mistake that cost the Union more than 6,000 killed and wounded in less than an hour. Instead of retiring to lick its wounds, however, the Army of the Potomac pushed on across the James River, intending to capture Petersburg, about 40 km (25 mi) south of Richmond. The Confederate capital's rail connection to the south ran through Petersburg. If direct approaches were impossible, Richmond might be toppled by sealing it off from outside help.

The initial assault on Petersburg was repelled (June 15) by a force of old men, boys, and casuals under Beauregard. They held on until Lee sent help and established fortified lines that stopped Grant's main attack on June 18. Grant then dug in for a siege. (See PETERSBURG CAMPAIGN.)

Lee knew that his only hope lay in restoring maneuverability to his army. He tried to divert some of Grant's strength by detaching Jubal EARLY, with Jackson's old corps, against Washington in mid-June. Early, who had some of Jackson's dash, stormed down the Shenandoah Valley and in July bombarded Washington's defenses—some of his sharpshooters even fired on Lincoln, who was watching from Fort Stevens's parapet. But the attack on Washington was no more than a raid. In August, Grant dispatched Philip SHERIDAN to the valley, where he conducted a campaign of systematic devastation. He finally defeated Early at Cedar Creek on October 19. Three weeks later the Northern presidential election took place, and Lincoln won comfortably.

On Feb. 3, 1865, a Southern delegation met Lincoln and Seward on a ship in Hampton Roads, but Davis's insistence on recognition of Southern independence prevented effective negotiations. The siege of Petersburg, however, was wearing Lee down. His lines finally broke at the end of March 1865; he evacuated Richmond on April 2 and retreated west, hoping to join Johnston's army somewhere in the Carolinas. A week's desperate quest for rations brought the Army of Northern Virginia to APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE, where it was virtually surrounded. Only 9,000 of Lee's 20,000-odd troops carried muskets at the last roll call. On Apr. 9, 1865, Lee surrendered his army to Grant.

Georgia and Carolina Campaigns

Leaving Chattanooga in early May 1864, Sherman invaded Georgia with three armies totaling 100,000 men. With an army of only 60,000, Johnston fell back mile by mile, stalling Sherman repeatedly. At Kennesaw Mountain, on June 27, he fought a pitched battle that cost Sherman dearly. Finally Johnston settled into Atlanta's defenses in early July. Davis, however, was furious at Johnston's unexplained retreat and made the error of replacing him with Gen. John B. HOOD on July 17. A gallant but reckless officer, Hood attacked furiously and lost. In early September he was forced to abandon Atlanta. Sherman's occupation of that key city buoyed Northern morale and contributed to Lincoln's success in the presidential election 2 months later. (See ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.)

Hood then tried a strategic diversion, in the best sense of the offensive-defensive: he invaded Tennessee, hoping to draw Sherman after him. Sherman, however, left George H. Thomas to deal with Hood, while he marched virtually unopposed to the sea. Laying waste as he went, Sherman's intent was to make "Georgia howl." He reached Savannah and occupied it on December 21.

In Tennessee, Hood won a costly battle at Franklin on November 30, but at Nashville on Dec. 15-16, 1864, his army was wrecked, and its remnants streamed toward Georgia.

Restored to Johnston's charge, the tiny Army of Tennessee sought to delay Sherman's powerful columns as they coursed through the Carolinas in the spring of 1865. At Bentonville, N.C., on Mar. 19-21, 1865, Johnston won his last victory, but Sherman kept pushing forward. On April 13, the day before Lincoln's assassination in Washington,

Sherman occupied Raleigh. At Durham Station, N.C., on Apr. 26, 1865, Johnston formally surrendered his army to Sherman. The main land campaign ended that day. Fighting west of the Mississippi continued to the end of May, but it was peripheral to the war's outcome.

DIPLOMACY AND NAVAL POLICY

Somehow the end seemed inevitable at Appomattox and at Durham Station, yet the issue had often hung in doubt. When Lincoln issued (Sept. 22, 1862) his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on the heels of dubious success at Antietam, he foiled the Confederacy's best chance for British recognition. The British cabinet, divided in sentiments toward the Civil War, was about to debate either outright recognition of the Southern government or an offer of mediation. Either would have vastly boosted Southern stock in the world.

Lincoln's proclamation did not actually free any slaves, since its provisions were confined to states not in Union control by January 1863, but the proclamation had dramatic domestic and foreign impact. When Lincoln followed it in January with a full document outlining emancipation as victory progressed, he changed the course of the war. Up to that time not all Northerners knew what they were fighting for; now they were on the side of freedom. Abroad, those who abhorred slavery—and they were many in places of power—took heart in a crusade against evil. The South, despite its claim that it fought for independence and the old spirit of American liberty, could not wholly slip the stigma of slave ownership.

The Trent Affair

Early in the Civil War, Britain threatened war with the United States over the TRENT AFFAIR. In November 1861 Captain Charles WILKES, of exploring fame, stopped the British mail steamer Trent at sea to remove from it two Confederate diplomats, James M. MASON and John SLIDELL. The shocked British public demanded action, and the British cabinet reinforced garrisons in Canada while awaiting Washington's response to its note of protest. Lincoln wanted no trouble with Britain, and after a period of tension, the two diplomats were released. The incident, however, strengthened the South's hopes of British recognition and alliance.

The Confederacy's Foreign Supplies

Confederate diplomatic efforts were deft after an initial fumbling period. When Judah P. BENJAMIN became Confederate secretary of state in March 1862, he brought a canny realism to diplomacy. He realized that European recognition would depend on martial success; while he waited for that success, he turned to active secondary diplomacy. Commercial agents were sent abroad to increase the amounts of supplies purchased there.

From early in the war the Confederate Ordnance Department, under the brilliant leadership of Josiah Gorgas (1818-83), had sent small, fast ships (blockade runners) to Bermuda, the Bahamas, and Cuba. At those islands, the runners picked up cargoes of munitions and other stores brought from Europe in large freighters. Private contractors who ran the blockade with luxury items or staples made fantastic profits; the business gained a dubious glamour as the South's resources dwindled and everything became scarce.

Benjamin at last determined to systematize this haphazard traffic. He sent a special agent, Colin McRae (1812-77), to Europe to manage all monies raised abroad and expenditures and orders for supplies. This system, inaugurated in 1863, produced remarkable results. Between 1861 and 1865, 330,000 small arms were imported for the government and perhaps another 270,000 for states and private firms. In the year from December 1863 to December 1864, 869,850 kg (1,933,000 lb) of saltpeter, 678,150 kg (1,507,000 lb) of lead, 3,884,400 kg (8,632,000 lb) of meat, and 234,000 kg (520,000 lb) of coffee were brought in.

In early 1864 the normally laissez-faire Confederate Congress passed laws commandeering room on outgoing and incoming runners for government cargoes, but this important centralizing step came too late. Had such bold steps, including the creation (March 1864) of a Bureau of Foreign Supplies been taken earlier, the system that provided much might have provided enough.

Confederate Quest of Recognition

Although they acknowledged the Confederacy's belligerent status, neither Britain nor France ever granted formal recognition. Time and attrition cut foreign support as they did Southern military strength. The best hope always lay with the Confederate armies, and as they thinned out, hope dimmed. Ingenious efforts were made to win foreign help, and, indeed, Pope Pius IX once seemed to offer tacit recognition by a letter, dated Dec. 3, 1863, addressed

to the President of the Confederate States. Southern agents published a newspaper, the Index, in London and solicited pro-Confederate sympathy in various other ways abroad. Substantial elements in Britain, France, Austria, Spain, and Russia leaned toward the aristocratic tradition apparently represented by the Confederates, but the crusade for freedom that Lincoln finally announced hardened British sentiment, and the other European powers would not act alone.

United States diplomacy had much to do with keeping Europe nominally neutral. In particular, Charles Francis ADAMS, Lincoln's envoy to London, played a deft game of persuasion and subtle threat that unsettled British cabinet opinion.

Confederate Cruisers

Adams not only wished to stop British recognition of the Confederacy, but he also wanted to stop the South from buying blockade runners and warships in Britain. U.S. agents operating along the Clydeside in Scotland fought clandestine skirmishes with Confederate naval agents. At first the British government refused to intervene in this situation, but in September 1863 it ordered that Confederate warships under construction in Britain be held in port.

Before this blow the South had put about 20 warships to sea, many of them built in Britain. The most famous of these Confederate cruisers was the Alabama, which slipped out of Liverpool in the summer of 1862. Commanded by Raphael SEMMES, it is a legend in sea warfare, capturing almost 70 U.S. merchant ships. So successful were the Alabama and other cruisers in raiding U.S. merchantmen that most of the latter "fled the flag" to other registries. If more cruisers had been built, they might have destroyed the U.S. merchant marine.

Naval Innovations

Commerce raiding was a novel weapon and a splendid example of the original sea warfare doctrine espoused by the Confederate navy secretary Stephen R. MALLORY. Mallory recognized that naval warfare was at a turning point. The day of the iron ships was coming, and Mallory backed his vision by converting the captured U.S.S. Merrimack into the ironclad C.S.S. Virginia. Although Mallory built other iron ships, he was hampered by the unreliable engines produced by Confederate shops, and metal was needed for cannon. Southern efforts to buy ironclads abroad were only partially successful. Nonetheless, Mallory and his officers deserve credit for spearheading the seapower of the future. Their innovations also included the torpedo boat; the water mine; and the first modern submarine, the H. L. Hunley, which sank a U.S. ship—and itself—in Charleston harbor in 1864.

The North responded with its own originality. The U.S.S. Monitor was quickly designed to do battle with the Merrimack/Virginia in the first clash of floating iron. In time, special river ironclads enabled the North to range Southern waterways almost at will. In time the Union navy became the best in the world. Its steadfast opponent, however, did not finally strike its colors until the Shenandoah, the last Confederate cruiser, lowered its flag in Liverpool on Nov. 6, 1865.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

With few industrial resources at the start, Southern officials made remarkable strides in creating a small industrialized nation. Logistics, however, finally defeated the Confederacy.

Management of Resources

Largely by the efforts of Gorgas and his colleagues in the Ordnance Bureau, important munitions works sprang up in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas; experimental laboratories were built in Macon, Ga.; a large-scale powder works appeared in Augusta, Ga.; and cannon foundries were built wherever iron could be found. Distribution difficulties, however, forced decentralization of manufacturing, which in turn fragmented transportation of finished goods to the field.

Labor became scarce as the Confederate draft law of April 1862 was stiffened. Blacks were increasingly used in jobs originally considered too critical for those whose loyalty was in doubt. Manpower was finally pooled in the hands of the secretary of war, who doled out enrolled men where emergencies demanded.

Just as there was no national plan for labor, there was none either for railroad, riverboat, or wagon management. Efforts that were made late in the war to manage the rail lines were ineffective, and by 1865, trains were rickety collections of nuts and bolts creeping along loose tracks at a maximum of 16 km/h (10 mph).

in the President of the Confederate States. Government agents obtained a copy of the letter in London and collected the Confederate currency in various other ways. The letter was also in the hands of the British. The letter and the British found the letter in the hands of the British. The letter was also in the hands of the British. The letter was also in the hands of the British.

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Confederate currency

Agents not only failed to stop British acquisition of the Confederate currency but also failed to stop the British from buying the currency. The British found the letter in the hands of the British. The letter was also in the hands of the British. The letter was also in the hands of the British.

British currency

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Northern efforts to centralize war management were only a little less chaotic, but resources overrode incompetence. A railroad construction corps smoothed the way for Union armies; the draft law of 1863 ensured ample manpower; and, above all, quartermaster, commissary, and other army staff organizations had the money they needed.

The Money Problem

Money was not always plentiful in the North. Paper money gradually intruded on specie, and large loans had to be floated to sustain the war effort, with financiers such as Jay COOKE serving as agents and making fortunes. However, money could be obtained in the North.

In the South money had to be printed. Starting with the sound idea that heavy taxation would save the currency, the Confederate Congress could never bring itself to levy against cotton, land, and slaves, the main elements of Southern wealth. Both sides introduced an income tax. The South adopted the unique and partly effective "tax-in-kind," which preempted a portion of each farm's output to provide food for troops. However, various schemes—the "produce loans," impressment, state bond issues, even the \$15 million Erlanger loan offered by a French financial house—failed to secure Confederate money. From a par level at the beginning, Confederate dollars constantly sagged as inflation paced defeat; by 1865, a Confederate dollar was worth about 1.5 cents in Union money.

COSTS OF THE WAR

The statistics of death and destruction are grim, cold, and not necessarily accurate. By some counts more than 2.25 million white, black, and Indian men were in the Union armies and navy. Of these more than 650,000 died from all causes or were wounded. Confederate statistics are vague. The historian E. B. Long, a careful student of war strengths, suggests that "perhaps 750,000 individuals would be reasonably close" as an estimate of Southern enrollments in the armies and navy. Of this number only a few were blacks, since the South did not enroll black troops until 1865, and then only after long debate about emancipation in exchange for service. Lee and Davis, who sought independence, supported the notion, but the Confederate Congress finally refused such manumission. In fact, black troops never reached the front lines.

James G. Randall and David Herbert Donald note other costs in their *Civil War and Reconstruction*: "Billions of treasure (Federal, Confederate, state, local, and unofficial), untold retardation of economic development, ruined homes, roads, buildings and fields, billions of dollar-value in slaves wiped out, a shattered merchant marine, and a wretched intangible heritage of hate . . . and intolerance." In dollars the war cost at least \$20 billion. In innocence its cost was enormous; in hope, pervasive, for it finished the American dream for a whole people and distorted it for another. Indeed, its wages still are paid in such places as Little Rock, Ark., Detroit, Chicago, and New York, wherever minorities are hated by the majority.

The war did not address once and for all one of its main causes—the race issue. In the postwar Reconstruction period (1865-77), Northern reformers sought to give the freed blacks not only protection but power in the Southern states. However, the effect of their programs, which were also punitive in intent, was to increase Southern white hostility toward the blacks as well as the North. The abandonment of Reconstruction left the blacks with their future merely patched around by the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution. Only long-term national prosperity and progress could begin to offset their harsh lot in both the South and the North.

Despite emancipation, then, the blacks were lasting casualties of the war. So was the Declaration of Independence. In the long afterwash of war, few Southerners, white or black, could pursue much happiness. Moreover, those many Northerners who themselves blinked at racial equality could only be uncertain of their virtue in victory. Their bothered conscience lingers in national affairs.

Frank E. Vandiver

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